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I. INTRODUCTION 
 There may not be a more mysterious term in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence than “purpose.” In this context, purpose is generically 
defined as the reason or reasons an officer took certain action.1 It is 
understandable that courts would elect to focus heavily on an officer’s 
purpose. If we wish to deter bad actors and promote an egalitarian 
administration of justice, an officer’s motivation for acting should be 
critically important to an analysis of the constitutionality of that officer’s 
action. Yet, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
subjective purpose of a police officer is irrelevant under the Fourth 
Amendment, outside of the special needs or administrative inspection 
context.2 This potential paradox is perhaps most puzzling in the context of 
whether an officer has conducted an unconstitutional search in the curtilage 
of one’s home. 
This article focuses on the meaning of the term “purpose,” and its 
relationship to searches conducted within the curtilage of one’s home under 
the Fourth Amendment. The analysis primarily focuses on three curtilage 
cases: one of which is a state case and the others are federal cases.3 There is 
a relative dearth of literature discussing purpose under the Fourth 
Amendment. The existing literature typically advocates for the Court to 
narrowly consider, or even rely upon, a government actor’s subjective 
                                                           
1 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 
404–5 (2006); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996); Horton v. California, 
496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). 
2 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 740 (2011); Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496 
U.S. at 138. 
3 This article will analyze Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013); State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 
578 (Minn. 2018); and then Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004). 
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motivation for taking certain actions.4 In contrast, this article does not dwell 
on the merits of whether considerations of a subjective purpose are 
preferable from a policy perspective.  
Instead, it first broadly argues that the Supreme Court is consistent 
when it maintains that an officer’s subjective purpose for acting is irrelevant 
under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court follows 
precedent and does not rely on, or even consider, an officer’s subjective 
purpose for acting.5 Objective evidence alone is used to determine an 
officer’s ostensible purpose.6 Therefore, the objective reasonableness of an 
officer’s actions is critical. Courts often appear to rely on an officer’s 
subjective purpose with its use of certain language. Nonetheless, that use 
simply creates a linguistic illusion of subjectivity. Objective evidence is key. 
Although the consideration of an officer’s subjective purpose would reduce 
the number of reprehensible government actors, objective evidence was—
and appears to remain—the only evidence vital to the constitutionality of an 
officer’s actions.7 Ultimately, an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant.8 
This argument leads to an additional, narrower one: purpose is 
innately subjective. Only the individual actor actually knows why he or she 
took action. The enunciation of an objective purpose is troubling. Reaching 
such a conclusion requires the analysis of objective evidence to determine 
an actor’s ostensible purpose. A court can say what an actor’s objectively 
determined purpose was. Yet, it cannot definitively say that it was the actor’s 
actual purpose. In fact, if the Court did determine the actor’s actual purpose, 
such a determination is constitutionally irrelevant.9 At the very least, courts 
currently use language that causes confusion and blurs the line between 
objective and subjective purposes in their analyses.  
Therefore, the Court is inconsistent to the extent it created an “area” 
prong and a “purpose” prong for testing whether an unconstitutional search 
occurred in the curtilage of one’s home.10 The area where the officer 
conducted the investigation is useful for determining whether the officer’s 
actions were objectively reasonable and consequently constitutional.11 This 
area, however, is not dispositive as to the constitutionality of the officer’s 
                                                           
4 See Craig M. Bradley, The Reasonable Policeman: Police Intent in Criminal Procedure, 
76 MISS. L. J. 339, 343 (2006); John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 
111 (1982). 
5 See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 740; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138. 
6 See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 740; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138. 
7 See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 740; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138. 
8 See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 740; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138. 
9 See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 740; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138. 
10 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013). 
11 Id. at 10.  
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actions.12 The consideration of all objective evidence, including the area 
where the officer went, provides an answer to the critical question: whether 
the officer’s intrusion relates to a lawful reason for entering a home’s 
curtilage. The purpose prong, in particular, creates issues due to the innate, 
subjective nature of purpose. Therefore, if the Court desires to make an 
officer’s subjective purpose truly irrelevant, the two-prong test should be 
abolished and all references to an individual’s purpose should cease. It is 
superfluous and confusing if the objective reasonableness of the officer’s 
actions is critical. A test of objective reasonableness that analyzes whether 
the officer’s intrusion relates to a lawful reason for entering the curtilage is 
more manageable, mitigates potential uncertainty, and, in essence, is already 
in place. 
II. PURPOSE, CURTILAGE, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Curtilage, the area “immediately surrounding and associated with the 
home . . . warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the 
home.”13 Whether a given area is considered curtilage is determined by a 
host of factors peripheral to the arguments posited in this article.14 In Florida 
v. Jardines, Detective Pedraja of the Miami-Dade Police Department was 
the recipient of an “unverified tip” that Jardines was growing marijuana in 
his home.15 Approximately one month later, the Department and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration dispatched a “joint surveillance team” to 
Jardines’ home.16 Detective Pedraja was a member of that team.17 There 
were no vehicles in Jardines’ driveway, and the ability to see inside Jardines’ 
home was nonexistent because the blinds were drawn.18  
Detective Pedraja watched the home for fifteen minutes prior to the 
arrival of Detective Bartlet, a “trained canine handler,” accompanied by the 
detective’s detection dog.19 The two detectives immediately proceeded to 
approach the home.20 As the detectives and the dog neared the front porch 
of Jardines’ home, the dog “apparently sensed one of the odors he had been 
trained to detect, and began energetically exploring the area for the strongest 
                                                           
12 Id. 
13 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). 
14 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 




19 Id. at 3–4. 
20 Id. at 3. 
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point source of that odor.”21 The dog traveled “back and forth, back and 
forth” across the breadth of the porch in an attempt to locate the source of 
the odor.22 Eventually, the dog sniffed the front door of Jardines’ home and 
sat down, which is “trained behavior” when the source of the odor is 
discovered.23 Detective Bartlet informed Detective Pedraja there had been 
a “positive alert for narcotics.”24 With this knowledge in hand, Detective 
Pedraja took leave and obtained a search warrant.25 The warrant was 
executed later that day, and its execution revealed marijuana plants.26 
Jardines was arrested and charged with drug trafficking.27  
Jardines subsequently moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that 
the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.28 While the 
trial court agreed, the Florida Third District Court of Appeals reversed.29 
However, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, 
approving the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence.30 The Florida 
Supreme Court reasoned that using the detection dog to investigate 
Jardines’ porch was a search under the Fourth Amendment unsupported 
by probable cause.31 Therefore, the warrant was invalidated, as information 
obtained from that illegal search was foundational to the warrant.32 The 
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, “limited to the 
question of whether the officers’ behavior was a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.”33 
The Court ultimately held the behavior was a search, relying on an 
approach that tacitly focused on the officers’ actions and their lack of 
relationship to the lawful conducting of a knock-and-talk.34 The Court also 
recognized that the public, including police officers, have a “traditional 
invitation,” that is, an implicit license to approach a “home by the front path, 
knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to 
linger longer) leave.”35 As enunciated in Jardines, the scope of that license is 
                                                           







28 Id. at 4–5. 





34 Id. at 12. 
35 Id. at 8. 
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limited to a “particular area” and a “specific purpose.”36 The majority was 
perturbed by the introduction of a detection dog to the curtilage of Jardines’ 
home.37 Police officers, devoid of a warrant, may approach the front door 
of a home and knock on the door but may “do no more than any private 
citizen might do.”38 Prevailing social norms do not invite visitors to search 
the area upon arrival.39  
The State argued that Supreme Court precedent establishes that the 
subjective motivation of a police officer is constitutionally irrelevant under 
the Fourth Amendment.40 The Court was quick to contextualize that 
assertion, stressing precedent merely establishes that an “objectively 
reasonable” search will not be deemed unconstitutional simply because a 
police officer’s “real reason” for conducting a search is distinct from the 
“validating reason” for conducting the search.41 The Court provided the 
example of a black man who is pulled over for not wearing a seatbelt will 
have no recourse simply because the police officer’s subjective purpose for 
pulling the man over was the officer’s malice towards African-Americans.42 
If the black man did fail to wear his seatbelt, that fact validates the officer’s 
decision to pull the man over regardless of the actual reason for which he 
was pulled over.43 Ultimately, the Court stressed that the precise question 
before it was whether “the officer’s conduct was an objectively reasonable 
search.”44  
A reasonable interpretation of the Court’s detailed opinion makes it 
seem as if the Court failed to abide by its own precedent. It also—whether, 
implicitly or not—made the officers’ subjective purpose relevant when 
determining the constitutionality of the officers’ actions.45 For instance, the 
Court specifically enunciated that there is no “customary invitation” to 
introduce “a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in 
hopes of discovering incriminating evidence.”46 However, hopefulness 
relates to an individual’s feelings and perhaps, emotional state. That feeling 
is unique to the individual alone. The individual is the only person capable 
of experiencing that exact feeling at that exact moment. Although people 
                                                           
36 Id. at 9. 
37  Id. 
38 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011). 
39 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9. 





45 See generally id. 
46 Id. at 9. 
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can debate how an objectively reasonable person would feel in any given 
situation, the only person who actually knows how they felt, or why they 
acted, is the individual who experienced the feeling or acted in a certain way. 
If the officer hoped to discover such evidence, that seems to be a subjective 
consideration that contradicts the Court’s precedent.47 At the very least, the 
Court’s language has the tendency to confuse.  
The foregoing is not the only language in Jardines that appears to create 
inconsistency and confusion. The fine line between an objective purpose 
and a subjective purpose is difficult to distinguish throughout the opinion. 
The Court stressed the “officers learned what they learned only by 
physically intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence.”48 Once again, 
the Court, by specifically referencing that the officers entered Jardines’ 
curtilage to “gather evidence,” makes it appear that the officers’ subjective 
motivation was vital to the Court’s inquiry.49 Such reference by the Court 
allows for the reasonable interpretation that it claims the subjective 
motivation of the officers was “to gather evidence.”50 If true, and such 
motivation was in fact relied on, the Court failed to follow precedent. It was 
unnecessary for the Court to say that the officers entered Jardines’ curtilage 
to complete such a task. This language tends to cause more confusion than 
clarity. Eventually, the Court held that the officers’ actions, including the use 
of the detection dog, constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.51 
The Court reasoned that the officers’ behavior “objectively reveals a 
purpose to conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think they 
had a license to do.”52 This statement should be interpreted as an assertion 
that the officers’ actions did not relate to a lawful purpose that allowed the 
officers to enter Jardines’ curtilage, that is, to conduct a lawful knock-and-
talk. 
Justice Alito’s dissent provides further insight into the confusion 
caused by the majority’s choice of language.53 Ultimately, Justice Alito takes 
a purely textual approach and argues the officers’ actions were nonintrusive 
and reasonable.54 Although his conclusion is not necessarily correct, Justice 
Alito’s approach is valuable as it forcefully disregards any consideration of 
the officers’ subjective purpose. Justice Alito clearly relies on objective 
evidence to conclude that the officers’ actions, including introducing the 
                                                           
47 Id.  




52 Id. at 10. 
53 Id. at 16–26. 
54 Id. at 23–25. 
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detection dog to Jardines’ porch, simply were not violative of the Fourth 
Amendment.55 Those actions did not exceed the scope of the implied 
license.56 While this conclusion cuts at the heart of the protections afforded 
by the Fourth Amendment, the simplicity and precision of Justice Alito’s 
reasoning deserves attention.  
Initially, Justice Alito argues the majority’s reliance on trespass 
principles is misguided and has no basis in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.57 Specifically, Justice Alito is perplexed that the majority 
believed Detective Bartlett “committed a trespass because he was 
accompanied during his otherwise lawful visit to the front door . . . by his 
dog.”58 Dogs have a magnificent sense of smell, and as such, have been relied 
on by law enforcement officers for centuries in Anglo-American society.59  
The officer and his dog approached Jardines’ home via “the route that 
any visitor would customarily use,” specifically over “the driveway and a 
paved path.”60 The entire process of walking up the driveway and path to 
the front door, followed by the dog alerting, and concluded by walking back 
to the street “took approximately a minute or two.”61 After the strongest 
source of the odor was located on Jardines’ porch, the officer and the dog 
“immediately returned to their patrol car.”62 Cumulatively, Justice Alito’s 
arguments support the same conclusion: the officer did not exceed the 
scope of the implied license to approach a home.63 This license assuredly 
has “certain spatial and temporal limits.”64 People, including police officers, 
may not, for example, loiter at the front door, approach the front door in 
the middle-of-the-night without permission, or “traipse through the garden, 
meander into the backyard, or take other circuitous detours.”65 
With these limitations in mind, Justice Alito shuns the notion that the 
officer’s subjective purpose for conducting an otherwise valid knock-and-
talk can make that knock-and-talk constitutionally impermissible.66 Even 
when the purpose of such a knock-and-talk is “to obtain evidence . . . the 
                                                           
55 Id. at 26. 
56 Id. at 22. 
57 Id. at 16. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 16–17. 
60 Id. at 17. 
61 Id. at 18. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 19. 
65 Id. at 19–20. 
66 Id. at 21. 
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license to approach still applies.”67 Regardless, then, of the officer’s 
subjective purpose, “gathering evidence . . . is a lawful activity that falls within 
the scope of the license to approach.”68 While this is disagreeable as a matter 
of policy, Justice Alito appropriately and affirmatively pronounces that he is 
in no way relying on the officer’s subjective purpose.69 
Justice Alito finishes his discussion by highlighting the majority’s 
peculiar choice of language with regard to purpose.70 What the majority 
meant by its conclusion that the officers’ actions objectively revealed a 
purpose to conduct a search puzzled Justice Alito.71 What that means, he 
takes it, is that anyone with knowledge of the officer’s actions “would infer 
that his subjective purpose was to gather evidence.”72 In other words, the 
objective facts available in the record allowed the fact-finder to make an 
artificial determination as to the government actor’s subjective purpose for 
acting. One could argue that if the former argument is true, the Court is 
inappropriately relying on the subjective motivations of the actor, regardless 
of whether that purpose is artificially determined using objective evidence.  
Justice Alito’s argument appears meritorious on its face; however, it 
fails to take into account the fact that the majority’s purpose determination 
was completed by solely using the objective facts available. The term 
“purpose” creates perplexities that tend to mislead, yet the officer’s 
ostensible purpose was still determined objectively. In reality, the objective 
facts show the officer’s actions were unrelated to a lawful purpose that would 
allow the officer to enter Jardines’ curtilage to conduct a knock-and-talk. 
The majority’s purpose determination provided the answer as to whether 
the officer’s actions were reasonable, no matter how the result of such 
analysis was phrased.73 Justice Alito also stressed that police officers, more 
often than not, primarily approach homes in order to gather evidence.74 If 
an officer’s subjective purpose were relied on, most knock-and-talks would 
be constitutionally impermissible. However, the introduction of a trained 
detective dog across the breadth of Jardines’ porch does not in any way 
relate to conducting a permissible knock-and-talk.  
If the dog accompanied the officer everywhere throughout his shift and 
simply sat at the front door upon reaching Jardines’ porch, perhaps the 
Court’s conclusion would have been different. Such action would arguably 
                                                           
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 22. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 See id. at 9–10.  
74 Id. at 21. 
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relate to a lawful purpose for entering one’s curtilage, specifically a simple 
knock-and-talk. However, it is always unreasonable for a detection dog to 
accompany a police officer when intruding into the curtilage. Among their 
functions of patrolling, searching, and pursuing suspects, detection dogs 
have one principle purpose: to detect narcotics and other contraband.75 The 
implied license does not grant an officer a license to search the curtilage of 
a home in the absence of a warrant. Justice Alito essentially made an 
argument that, in contrast to the majority’s conclusion, the officer’s actions 
did in fact relate to a lawful purpose that allows an officer to enter one’s 
curtilage. Although his reasoning was phrased solely in terms of 
reasonability—that is, that the officer did not exceed the scope of the implied 
license to approach—Justice Alito relied on the path taken, the amount of 
time present on the porch, and the time of day to stress the officer acted 
constitutionally.76 While Justice Alito’s lack of concern for individual privacy 
is apparent, he did shed light on linguistic issues within the majority 
opinion.77  
However, there is light at the end of the tunnel. When discussing a 
concept as abstract as purpose, it is difficult to ensure that the entirety of an 
opinion lacks confusing phrases. Notwithstanding any potentially perplexing 
language, a detailed reading of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion alleviates any 
concern that the Court relied on the officer’s subjective purpose. As a result, 
the majority’s reasoning was consistent with precedent. It simply failed to 
articulate its conclusions in the most coherent fashion. Although it is 
arguable the majority failed to clearly rely on an objectively determined 
purpose, in reality, the officer’s subjective purpose was disregarded. The 
majority determined it was objectively unreasonable, and by extension, an 
unconstitutional search, to allow a police dog, with its acute sense of smell 
and thorough training, to repeatedly canvas the breadth of a home’s porch.78 
Such action did not reasonably relate to a lawful reason that allows an officer 
                                                           
75 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AND TESTING PROGRAM, GUIDE FOR THE SELECTION OF 
DRUG DETECTORS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION, NIJ GUIDE 601-00, 20–22 
(2000); see also KENNETH FURTON, ET AL., THE SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON DOG 
AND ORTHOGONAL DETECTOR GUIDELINES (SWGDOG), NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
JUSTICE REPORT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 134-139 (2010); Rebecca Schreiber, 
Implementation of a K9 Unit, FLA. CRIM. JUST. EXECUTIVE INST., FLA. DEP’T OF L. 
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/FCJEI/Programs/SLP/Documents/Full-
Text/Schreiber.aspx [https://perma.cc/CS5F-PJ9R].  
76 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 22. 
77 See id. 
78 Id. at 9. 
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to enter one’s curtilage and specifically, conduct a knock-and-talk.79 There 
is a stark difference between the generic home visitor and a “canine forensic 
investigation.”80 Although the former may often be unwelcome, it is, at least, 
expected. In contrast, no reasonable person would expect, or find it 
reasonable to allow, a police officer to introduce a trained police canine to 
explore the breadth of his or her home’s curtilage.  
The same reasoning applies regardless of the occupation of the 
individual entering the curtilage. Suppose an individual entered the curtilage 
of one’s home with a metal detector and began canvassing the curtilage. One 
could speculate as to that individual’s subjective purpose for taking such 
action, yet such speculation is irrelevant. The individual’s subjective purpose 
for intruding within the curtilage could be to steal property or to find a long-
lost familial artifact. Neither purpose changes the fact that such action is 
objectively unreasonable, since such intrusion does not relate to a lawful 
purpose for entering one’s curtilage. In contrast, it would be lawful for an 
individual to approach the home’s front door, knock, wait briefly to be 
received, and ask for permission to use the metal detector in the 
homeowner’s curtilage. Ultimately, permission is required to roam around 
in someone’s yard in an attempt to discover items. Similar to the officer 
being accompanied by his trained canine, bringing a metal detector onto an 
individual’s property without consent creates the reasonable impression that 
the individual is not there for permissible reasons. Therefore, regardless of 
the person’s subjective purpose, such action would lead a reasonable 
homeowner to “well, call the police.”81 
III. MINNESOTA’S HIGH COURT THROWS ITS HAT IN THE RING 
In State v. Chute, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an officer 
conducted an objectively unreasonable search that violated the 
Respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights.82 The Court reasoned the officer’s 
actions exceeded the scope of permissible knock-and-talk procedure.83 The 
facts of Chute present a unique opportunity to analyze a state court’s 
handling of a curtilage issue and its accompanying purpose inquiry. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court appropriately determined that the officer’s 
actions were unreasonable in the absence of a warrant.84 How the Court 
reached its decision, however, deserves substantial attention in light of the 
                                                           
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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Jardines decision and the Supreme Court’s purpose enunciations more 
generally. 
In Chute, an individual residing in a metropolitan suburb discovered 
that his pop-up tent camper had vanished, and he subsequently reported 
the apparent theft to the local police.85 Several months later, the individual 
was out for a drive on a county road and noticed what appeared to be his 
camper nestled in defendant Chute’s backyard.86 After this discovery, the 
individual turned around and drove back in the opposite direction to “verify 
that it was his stolen camper.”87 The individual stated he was able to verify 
the camper was his own because of the distinctive characteristics of the 
camper.88 After making this verification, the individual informed the police.89 
The layout of Chute’s property deserves attention. Trees border the 
property’s west side, an obscuring fence flanks its east side, and a wetland is 
situated at its southern point.90 Chute’s home faces north and is located on 
the county road.91 The property has two driveways.92 One of the driveways, 
located on the west side of the property, is short, paved, and leads to a 
detached garage.93 An additional garage is located southwest of Chute’s 
home towards the rear of the property.94 The other driveway meanders 
along the property’s east side, is accessible from the county road, is unpaved, 
and loops around into Chute’s backyard.95 The district court found that the 
eastside driveway is “well-worn” and functions as a “turnaround or circle.”96 
The camper was situated in the southeast corner of the property near the 
end of the unpaved driveway.97 
Shortly after receiving the tip, an officer was dispatched to the scene.98 
From the end of the eastside driveway, while still on the county road, the 
officer “verified” the camper’s features mirrored the description stated in 
the police report created at the time of the alleged theft.99 After making this 
verification, the officer entered his squad car and drove approximately 
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halfway down the eastside driveway.100 At this point, the officer was about 
200 feet from the county road.101 The officer proceeded to exit his squad car 
and walk to the camper.102 After arriving at the camper the officer realized 
the camper’s vehicle identification number (VIN) and license plate were no 
longer present.103 Determined not to leave empty-handed, the officer called 
the camper’s manufacturer who informed him that a partial VIN was 
stamped on the frame of the camper.104 The officer located this partial VIN 
and determined the partial number was consistent with the VIN of the 
stolen camper.105 The officer then proceeded to enter the camper and 
discovered a personal item that belonged to the owner of the camper.106 
Upon verifying that the camper had been stolen, the officer intended 
to “make contact with the homeowner.”107 The officer “heard voices” 
emanating from the garage in the southwest corner of the home and decided 
he should attempt to make contact there.108 The officer knocked at the 
garage and was greeted by Chute.109 The officer requested and was granted 
permission to search the garage.110 The officer subsequently discovered a 
host of personal property that belonged to the same individual who owned 
the camper.111 After making this discovery, the officer requested permission 
to search Chute’s home.112 Consent was granted and more property 
belonging to the camper’s owner was found in Chute’s home.113 
Chute was charged with felony possession of stolen property, and he 
subsequently moved to suppress “all evidence found by police pursuant to 
a warrantless search” of his property.114 The district court denied Chute’s 
motion, concluding the officer was authorized to seize the camper because 
it was located on the eastside driveway, which was “impliedly open to the 
public to access [Chute’s] home.”115 Therefore, the officer “had a lawful right 
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of access to the camper.”116 Chute was ultimately convicted at trial.117 
However, the district court did not make an explicit finding that the eastside 
driveway was within the curtilage of Chute’s home.118 
The state court of appeals reversed, stressing the officer did not have a 
“lawful right of access to the camper” located within the curtilage of Chute’s 
home.119 Under Minnesota law, “police with legitimate business may enter 
areas within the curtilage of the home if those areas are impliedly open to 
the public.”120 The legitimacy of an entry into one’s curtilage is determined 
by analyzing the “scope of the implied license” as articulated in Florida v. 
Jardines.121 Whether the scope of the implied license was exceeded, this 
article argues, is properly determined only by analyzing whether the officer’s 
actions related to a lawful purpose that would allow him to enter one’s 
curtilage. The court of appeals concluded the scope of the implied license 
was transcended, as the officer’s entry into the curtilage was conducted with 
“the purpose to conduct a search.”122 Further, the unlawful search of Chute’s 
curtilage tainted the subsequent search of Chute’s home.123 
The state filed a petition for review arguing the court of appeals erred 
by concluding the search of the camper was unlawful.124 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s first task was to consider whether the officer conducted a 
“trespassory search of Chute’s home when he entered the property to 
examine the camper.”125 To do so, the Court had to determine whether the 
camper was located within the curtilage of Chute’s home.126 If the camper 
was located within the curtilage, the officer is constrained by the Fourth 
Amendment.127 In contrast, if the camper was not located in the curtilage, it 
would be considered to be in “open fields,” and the Fourth Amendment 
would not govern the officer’s actions.128 
By using the phrase “to examine the camper,” the Court placed itself 
in danger of creating an analytical bind before it even began to explain its 
conclusions.129 Similar to the Supreme Court in Jardines, the Minnesota 




119 Id.; see also State v. Chute, 887 N.W.2d 834, 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016). 
120 Chute, 887 N.W.2d at 841 (citing State v. Crea, 233 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1975)). 
121 Id. (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6–11 (2013)). 
122 Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 582 (citing Chute, 887 N.W.2d at 842). 
123 Chute, 887 N.W.2d at 843–44. 
124 Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 582. 
125 Id. at 583. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 583–84. 
128 Id. at 584. 
129 Id. at 583. 
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Supreme Court was also at times careless with its language. For instance, it 
was misleading for the Minnesota Supreme Court to end the foregoing 
sentence with a consideration of whether the officer entered Chute’s 
property “to examine the camper.”130 Whether the officer’s actions related 
to the lawful conducting of a knock-and-talk was key, regardless of why the 
officer subjectively entered Chute’s property. Particularly, the location of 
the camper, and by extension, where the officer went on Chute’s property, 
was paramount. These considerations of location should be used to evaluate 
whether the officer’s actions related to a lawful purpose for entering Chute’s 
property.  
The state understood the significance of location by arguing the 
camper was located too far away from Chute’s home to be protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.131 In other words, it was objectively unreasonable to 
believe the camper was contained within the curtilage of Chute’s home.132 
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment did not constrain the officer’s actions 
regardless of his subjective purpose.133 Ultimately, after applying the Dunn 
factors, the Court concluded Chute’s backyard and the eastern, unpaved 
driveway were within the curtilage of Chute’s home.134 As a result, Chute was 
afforded Fourth Amendment protections for his camper.135 
The Court’s second task was to determine whether the officer had an 
implied license to enter onto the curtilage.136 Whether a landowner has 
granted another a license to enter onto his curtilage is a question of fact.137 
The district court concluded that since an obvious, shabby pathway existed 
and two vehicles were parked near the camper, Chute had granted the 
public an implied license to access his curtilage to seek a backyard entrance 
to his home and garage.138 The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that 
                                                           
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 584. 
132 See id. at 585. 
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 584 (listing “four relevant factors to determine whether a disputed area falls within 
the curtilage: ‘[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, [2] whether 
the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the uses to 
which the area is put, and [4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from 




137 N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Minn. 1963). 
138 Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 586. 
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since the record supported the district court’s conclusion, that conclusion 
was not clearly erroneous.139 
The Court’s final task was to determine whether the officer exceeded 
the scope of the implied license.140 To do so, the Court relied on the test 
enunciated in Jardines, taking pains to assert that, “we must determine the 
officer’s purpose, objectively, for entering the curtilage.”141 Although the 
preceding phrase is misleading to the extent a true purpose can be 
objectively determined, the Court appropriately relied on available objective 
facts to determine the officer’s ostensible purpose.142 That purpose, 
determined via an analysis of the officer’s location and his actions, showed 
the officer’s intrusion into the curtilage did not relate to conducting a knock-
and-talk, which is the lawful purpose allowing an officer to enter one’s 
curtilage.143 Specifically, the location of the camper required the officer to 
“deviate substantially” from the path that would take him to the back of 
Chute’s home or garage.144 This, in conjunction with the officer’s rigorous, 
lengthy inspection of the outside and inside of the camper, led the Court to 
conclude that the officer exceeded the scope of the implicit license to 
approach a home and conduct a knock-and-talk.145 Hence, the Court’s 
decision should have been a straightforward one when based on these two 
persuasive pieces of objective evidence. 
Unfortunately, the Court once again placed itself in linguistic limbo by 
stating: “the evidence demonstrates that the officer’s purpose for entering 
the curtilage was to conduct a search.”146 However, the reason that an officer 
actually entered the curtilage, whether to conduct a permissible knock-and-
talk or to conduct an illegal search, is constitutionally irrelevant or, at least, 
it should be according to Supreme Court precedent.147 The relationship 
between the officer’s intrusion and lawful purposes for entering the curtilage 
is crucial. Similar to Jardines, the record here also objectively demonstrates 
that the officer’s intrusion was exceedingly unrelated to conducting a 
permissible knock-and-talk.148 Fortunately, there is no subjective evidence in 
                                                           
139 Id.; see State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 223 (Minn. 2010) (stating that the Court reviews 
district court factual findings for clear error). 
140 Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 586. 
141 Id.; see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013). 
142 Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 586–87. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 587. 
145 Id. at 586–87. 
146 Id. at 587. 
147 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 73 (2011); Whren v United States, 517 U.S. 806 
(1996). 
148 See Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 581. 
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the record that demonstrates, or even lends credence to, the notion that the 
officer entered Chute’s property for the purpose of conducting a search.149 
In other words, there is no statement or other evidence offered by the officer 
that demonstrates the officer subjectively entered the curtilage to conduct a 
search. This fact makes it easier to conclude that—although this Court’s 
choice of language occasionally has a subjective bent—the Court objectively 
determined that the officer took action unrelated to a lawful reason allowing 
the officer to enter Chute’s property, rendering the officer’s action 
unconstitutional.150 
Assuming such subjective evidence did exist, it would have been 
constitutionally impermissible to consider it when determining whether the 
officer exceeded the scope of the implied license to conduct a knock-and-
talk. Appropriately, the officer’s ostensible purpose was determined 
objectively. These purpose determinations, however, cause more confusion 
than clarity. Nonetheless, the home and its surrounding areas should be 
entitled to the most stringent of privacy protections. The officer’s actions 
did not relate to a lawful purpose for entering the curtilage, and therefore, 
those actions were objectively unreasonable.151 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court precisely followed United States Supreme Court precedent.152 
Although it occasionally composed an illogical phrase when enunciating its 
conclusions, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly determined the 
officer’s actions were constitutionally impermissible.153  
IV. THE SUPREME COURT WANTS ANOTHER SHOT AT THE TITLE 
In Collins v. Virginia, decided within three months of Chute, the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether “the automobile 
exception of the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer, uninvited and 
without a warrant, to enter the curtilage of a home in order to search a 
vehicle parked therein.”154 In that case, an orange and black-colored 
motorcycle had been observed committing several traffic infractions.155 One 
investigating police officer visited the defendant’s Facebook page, where he 
found pictures displaying the motorcycle in question at the top of the 
                                                           
149 Id. 
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 587; see also Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. 2001); State v. Crea, 346, 
233 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1975). 
152 Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 587 (applying Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013)). 
153 Id. at 588. 
154 Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1668 (2018). 
155 Id. 
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defendant’s driveway.156 The officer was then able to discover the location of 
the home in the Facebook pictures; he drove to the home and remained 
parked on the street.157 From there, the officer noticed what appeared to be 
the motorcycle located in the same position on the driveway as in the 
pictures underneath a tarp.158 The officer then intruded upon the property, 
approached the motorcycle, removed the tarp, and determined that the 
motorcycle looked identical to the one that had previously eluded him.159 
After running the motorcycle’s license plate and VIN, the officer confirmed 
the motorcycle had in fact been stolen.160 The defendant was arrested for 
receiving stolen property after admitting the motorcycle had been 
purchased absent a title.161 The trial court subsequently denied the 
defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless 
search of the motorcycle.162 Although the courts’ reasoning differed, both 
the Court of Appeals of Virginia and the Supreme Court of Virginia 
affirmed the lower court’s decision.163 
The U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the 
automobile exception justifies a physical intrusion into the curtilage of one’s 
home.164 The answer to this question is “no.”165 Unfortunately, the Court 
again struggled to paint its analysis of the constitutionality of the officer’s 
actions with the appropriate stroke of objectivity.166 In other words, the Court 
appeared to consider the officer’s subjective purpose while analyzing the 
constitutionality of the officer’s actions.167 The Court went out of its way to 
reference that the officer’s stated purpose in removing the tarp from the 
motorcycle was “to investigate further.”168 Therefore, the officer’s subjective 
purpose was actually “to investigate further.”169 Why the Court felt it 
necessary to include this quote is paradoxical in light of its precedent. It is 
irrelevant whether the officer did in fact remove the tarp “to investigate 






161 Id. at 1668–69. 
162 Id. at 1669. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 1671. 
165 Id. 
166 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013). 
167 Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1668. 
168 Id.  
169 Id. 
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further.” 170 Although such a statement makes it easy to conclude that the 
officer entered the defendant’s property for unlawful reasons, the statement 
is also inherently subjective. If one goes for a run to feel better, his or her 
subjective purpose for running is to feel better. If analyzed in a vacuum, the 
inclusion of this statement was inconsistent with precedent. Fortunately, 
however, it was extraneous and had no effect on the Court’s conclusions. 
The Court’s apparent reliance on the officer’s statement is not the only 
example where the majority seemed to improperly consider, or at least 
attempted to discern, the officer’s subjective purpose in its opinion. Relying 
on Jardines, the Court stressed “[w]hen a law enforcement officer physically 
intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment has occurred.”171 Again, the inclusion of the phrase 
“to gather evidence” implies the officer’s subjective purpose for entering the 
curtilage was considered and helped lead the Court to conclude that the 
officer’s conduct was constitutionally impermissible.172 Yet, as will be shown, 
it was irrelevant why the officer actually entered the curtilage, and the Court 
understood this.  
It would be a devastating blow to the protections afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment to allow an officer “to rely on the automobile exception 
to gain entry into a house or its curtilage for the purpose of conducting a 
vehicle search.”173 While the Court’s determination is not necessarily correct 
in that the officer’s actions were unconstitutional, that statement is again 
misleading. A true purpose cannot be determined objectively. The inclusion 
of such language, therefore, has a strong tendency to make the Court seem 
as if it is failing to follow its own precedent by relying on an officer’s 
subjective motivation.174 This statement implies that if the officer said he 
entered a house or curtilage for the purpose of having a cup of tea—or at 
least not to conduct a search—the officer’s actions are likely permissible. Yet, 
whether the officer’s actions were objectively related to a lawful purpose for 
entering the curtilage is controlling.175 This is true regardless of whether the 
officer subjectively acted for the purpose of conducting a search. 
                                                           
170 See, e.g., Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004); Whren v. United States, 517 
U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 
U.S. 325 (1987) (holding that mere reasonable suspicion is not sufficient to invoke the plain-
view doctrine). 
171 Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013)). 
172 See id. 
173 Id. at 1672. 
174 See, e.g., Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153; Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (1996); Horton, 496 U.S. 
at 138; Hicks, 480 U.S. 325 (1987). 
175 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10; Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). 
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The Court was not finished. Near the end of its opinion it stressed: 
“[t]he ability to observe inside curtilage from a lawful vantage point is not 
the same as the right to enter curtilage without a warrant for the purpose of 
conducting a search to obtain information not otherwise accessible.”176 This 
statement implies that so long as the officer did not enter the curtilage absent 
a warrant for the purpose of conducting a search to obtain otherwise 
unattainable information, the officer’s actions were constitutionally 
permissible. This is simply not true.177 If anything, the lack of a warrant 
bolsters the objective unreasonableness of the officer’s actions. A proper 
analysis would not consider whether the officer entered the curtilage to 
obtain information not otherwise accessible. Instead, the focus would be on 
whether the officer’s intrusion into the curtilage related to a lawful purpose 
allowing one to enter the curtilage. Here, the officer’s actions were obviously 
unrelated to lawfully conducting a knock-and-talk.178 
Notwithstanding these choices of language, the Court objectively 
determined the actions of the officer were constitutionally impermissible in 
the absence of a warrant.179 The officer’s actions were objectively 
unreasonable.180 The officer’s subjective purpose for entering the curtilage 
was irrelevant.181 People have an “expectation of privacy in their property.”182 
They assume their property will not be intruded upon or rummaged 
through.183 It must be highlighted that most Fourth Amendment cases 
involve a defendant who has in fact committed some illegal action.184 
Nonetheless, this fact must be separated from the analysis. A test of 
constitutionally permissible action affects everyone, not just those who 
undertook illegal activity. 
Here, the officer did not conduct an appropriate knock-and-talk.185 
The officer walked up the driveway and approached the parked, covered 
                                                           
176 Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1675. 
177 See, e.g., Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 154; Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138; 
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 325 (1987). 
178 Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1668. 
179 Id. at 1671. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 312 n.3 (1987). 
183 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (claiming opposition to British officers 
rummaging through homes in an unrestrained searches inspired the Revolution itself); 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) (holding that a physical intrusion of private 
property constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
184 See, e.g., Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1666; Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013); State v. Chute, 
887 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016). 
185 Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1668.  
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motorcycle, and not Collins’ front door.186 As the Court noted, a legitimate 
visitor would only walk about halfway up the driveway, turn right, and go up 
the steps leading to the front porch.187 Instead, the officer trekked the 
entirety of the driveway.188 This action constituted an initial Fourth 
Amendment violation, as it was a physical intrusion unrelated to the lawful 
purpose of conducting a knock-and-talk. After arriving at the top of the 
driveway, which abutted the home, the officer removed the tarp covering 
the motorcycle and ran its license plate and VIN.189 The action of removing 
the tarp did not relate to conducting a lawful knock-and-talk.190 Moreover, 
the action of running the motorcycle’s license plate and VIN was an 
additional, unlawful physical intrusion that did not relate to conducting a 
lawful knock-and-talk.191  
Reasonable people expect that their property immediately adjacent to 
the home will remain free from intrusion.192 There was no attempt by the 
officer to reach Collins at the front door until the officer had confirmed his 
suspicion that the motorcycle was, in fact, stolen.193 Objectively, the officer’s 
actions were unreasonable. It did not matter what the officer’s subjective 
purpose was. Even though the officer stated he entered the curtilage “to 
investigate further,”194 the Court’s reasoning is best understood as an implicit 
enunciation that the officer’s actions did not relate to a lawful purpose for 
entering the curtilage, which would be to conduct a knock-and-talk. If the 
Court is committed to disregarding the officer’s true subjective purpose, the 
only inconsistency is any reference to an officer’s purpose at all. 
It is again beneficial to analyze Justice Alito’s dissent.195 Ultimately, the 
inquiry of constitutionality broadly requires a determination as to the 
reasonability of the officer’s actions.196 Although Justice Alito’s conclusion is 
incorrect as to the reasonability of the officer’s actions, he presented a 
narrow determination to follow when analyzing the constitutionality of an 
officer’s actions. Specifically, Justice Alito immediately stressed: “[t]he 
Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable’ searches. What the police did 
                                                           
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 1671. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 1668. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1671. 
192 Id. at 1666 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013)). 
193 Id. at 1668–69. 
194 Id. at 1668. 
195 Id. at 1680. 
196 Id. at 1682. 
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in this case was entirely reasonable.”197 Justice Alito’s arguments are best 
understood as assertions that the officer’s actions did not constitute an 
objectively unreasonable intrusion.198 If Justice Alito reached this conclusion 
here, it is difficult to imagine a factual scenario involving curtilage that Justice 
Alito would conclude is ever constitutionally impermissible. 
Nowhere in the dissent does Alito reference the officer’s subjective 
purpose. Alito does not use language that is arguably subjective or explicitly 
consider any subjective evidence.199 The entire analysis is framed in terms of 
intrusiveness, which, as will be shown, is also constitutionally irrelevant. 
Specifically, Justice Alito notes the ready mobility of the motorcycle, the fact 
that the officer made a “short” walk up the driveway, a lack of damage to 
the home or curtilage, and the fact that the officer had probable cause to 
believe the motorcycle was stolen and had been involved in the commission 
of crimes.200 Justice Alito argues the Court’s conclusion does not “comport 
with the reality of everyday life.”201 In sum, Justice Alito’s dissent stressed the 
Court’s decision was “strikingly unreasonable.”202 Unlike in Jardines, 
however, the evidence relied upon by Justice Alito may relate to 
reasonableness generally. However, it only slightly relates to whether the 
officer’s actions related to the lawful conducting of a knock-and-talk. The 
record shows the officer’s actions obviously did not.203 
It is beneficial to conclude this discussion with thoughts on a 
commentator’s understanding of purpose. Professor Nirej Sekhon argues 
that all determinations as to an actor’s subjective purpose must be 
completed using objective evidence.204 Sekhon contextualizes this assertion 
by stating at its core, determining an actor’s purpose in this way equates to a 
“subjective test.”205 Each of these arguments is faulty, and they do not mesh 
with one another.  
All determinations as to an actor’s subjective purpose need not be 
completed using objective evidence. Perhaps this is true in order to be 
constitutionally permissible. However, the former argument highlights 
evidentiary and linguistic issues that again cause problems for courts. Very 
rarely is there any truly subjective evidence in the context of the Fourth 
                                                           
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 1680–83.  
200 Id. at 1681. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 1671. 
204 Nirej Sekhon, Purpose, Policing, and the Fourth Amendment, 107 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 65, 79 (2017). 
205 Id. 
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Amendment. This does not mean an officer’s subjective purpose needs to 
be determined using objective evidence. Additionally, courts do not try to 
decipher an actor’s subjective purpose.206 Rather, courts use objective 
evidence to determine an apparent purpose.207 If an actor’s true subjective 
purpose needs to be deciphered, which is rarely possible anyway, the only 
evidence appropriate to make such a determination is subjective evidence. 
As for the latter argument, even if the former argument were true, such a 
test would not be subjective. The courts are apathetic as to what the actor’s 
true subjective purpose was.208 Perhaps the test is artificially subjective from 
the perspective that a purpose is always inherently subjective. Yet, to say 
such a test is “just” subjective glosses over the truly objective considerations 
of the courts.209 Again, these thoughts highlight the confusion that exists. 
V.  A MISCELLANEOUS CASE THAT HIGHLIGHTS THE LINGUISTIC 
DILEMMA 
Before discussing why the two-pronged test of the constitutionality of 
action within curtilage should be superseded by a test of objective 
reasonability that analyzes whether the officer’s actions relate to a lawful 
purpose for entering one’s curtilage, it is useful to look at a case that analyzes 
purpose outside of the curtilage context. In Devenpeck v. Alford, the 
respondent was arrested and charged with violating Washington’s State 
Privacy Act after recording conversations he had with two police officers 
after being pulled over.210 At the scene, the respondent accurately protested 
his arrest, stating that a Washington Court of Appeals opinion allowed him 
to record “roadside conversations with police officers.”211 Believing the 
arrest to be lawful under Washington’s State Privacy Act, one officer 
instructed an accompanying officer to take the respondent to jail.212  
As it turns out, the respondent’s actions did not constitute a crime 
under Washington’s State Privacy Act.213 However, probable cause existed 
to arrest the respondent for impersonating and obstructing law enforcement 
officers.214 The Washington Court of Appeals held that the crimes of 
impersonating and obstructing law enforcement officers were not “closely 
                                                           
206 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996). 
207 Id. at 812 (citing United States v. Villamonte–Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 (1983)) 
208 Id. 
209 See id. 
210 543 U.S. 146, 149–50 (2004).  
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 150. 
213 Id. at 152. 
214 Id. 
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related” to the crime the respondent was arrested for.215 Additionally, the 
Court of Appeals also held it was objectively unreasonable for an officer to 
believe it was lawful to arrest the respondent for violating Washington’s 
State Privacy Act.216 Therefore, the arrest was unlawful. At its core, this is a 
mistake of law case. The question certified by the Supreme Court was 
“whether an arrest is lawful under the Fourth Amendment when the 
criminal offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is not ‘closely 
related’ to the offense stated by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.”217 
Relying on Whren, the Court stressed the officer’s subjective purpose 
for conducting an arrest need not be that the person under arrest took action 
that gave rise to probable cause to arrest for the specific criminal offense.218 
For example, imagine an officer sees a person take some action. The officer 
believes that action gives rise to probable cause that a specific crime has 
been committed. The officer proceeds to arrest that person on the basis that 
there is probable cause to believe that specific crime was committed. In 
other words, the officer’s purpose for arresting the person is that the person 
committed a specific crime. As events unfold, it turns out there actually was 
not probable cause to believe that that specific crime was committed. Yet, 
there was actually probable cause to arrest the person for a crime distinct 
from the crime for which the person was actually arrested. If viewed 
objectively, the officer’s actions were justified, that is, if reasonable, the 
officer’s actions will not be invalidated.219 
Therefore, the Court held that a rule requiring the offense underlying 
an arrest to be “closely related” to the offense for which there is actual 
probable cause is inconsistent with the notion that the subjective purpose of 
an officer is irrelevant.220 The Court had no desire to make the subjective 
motivation of an officer relevant to the “lawfulness of an arrest.”221  
Justice Scalia provided an interesting and accurate perspective on the 
irrelevance of subjective purpose. He argued an officer’s subjective purpose 
for making an arrest, “however it is determined (and of course subjective 
intent is always determined by objective means), is simply no basis for 
invalidating an arrest.”222 This statement correctly asserts that regardless of 
whether or how a subjective purpose can be determined, such 
                                                           
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 148. 
218 Id. at 153. 
219 Id.  
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 154. 
222 Id. at 154–55.  
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determination is irrelevant.223 The point that matters is that any true or 
apparent subjective purpose is itself irrelevant.224  
Notwithstanding the preceding, although one can argue it is plausible 
to determine an apparent purpose using objective evidence, a purpose is 
innately subjective and cannot truly be determined objectively. Objective 
evidence can be evaluated as to the reasonability of an officer’s action, but 
it cannot be evaluated to definitively determine why someone actually acted. 
While Justice Scalia’s statement is correct from the perspective that the 
subjective intent of an actor is irrelevant, it also highlights the confusion and 
linguistic difficulties afflicting the courts handling these cases.225 
VI. THE TWO-PRONG TEST SHOULD BE ABOLISHED 
In Horton v. California, the Supreme Court proclaimed that: 
“evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of 
objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the 
subjective state of mind of the officer.”226 While the sole reliance on 
objective standards does not always lead to “evenhanded law enforcement,” 
to the contrary, the opposite is often true—objective standards are 
exceedingly more manageable than subjective ones.227 The degree of 
objective evidence available will always dwarf the subjective evidence 
available, if any of the latter even exists.228  
Therefore, if the Court is steadfast in its reliance on precedent, that is, 
the subjective motivations of an actor are irrelevant, all references to an 
individual’s purpose should cease. This is in light of the fact that the Court’s 
current analysis of purpose has the tendency to cause great confusion. The 
Jardines two-prong test,229 and particularly the purpose prong, should be 
abolished in favor of an objective test of reasonability that analyzes whether 
the officer’s intrusion within the curtilage is related to a lawful purpose and 
not the officer’s subjective purpose for entering the curtilage. In this context, 
a lawful purpose for entering one’s curtilage would be to conduct a 
permissible knock-and-talk. This test focuses heavily on the officer’s 
                                                           
223 See id.  
224 Id. at 153. 
225 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013); State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 
2018); Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018). 
226 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990). 
227 Id. 
228 R. George Wright, Objective and Subjective Tests in the Law, 16 U. N.H. L. REV. 121, 
123 n.11 (2017).  
229 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9 (“The scope of a license--express or implied--is limited not only to 
a particular area but also to a specific purpose.”). 
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location within the curtilage. If the intrusion is unrelated to a lawful purpose 
for entering the curtilage, such action is unconstitutional regardless of why 
the officer actually went where they did within the curtilage. This test, of 
course, presumes no other exigencies are present. 
This proposed test derives its logic from Arizona v. Hicks, in which 
Justice Scalia focused on why officers were justified in entering an apartment 
in relation to what one officer did after entering the apartment.230 The facts 
of Hicks deserve attention. On April 18, 1984, a bullet was fired through 
the floor of respondent's apartment, striking and injuring a man in the 
apartment below.231 Police officers arrived and entered respondent's 
apartment to search for the shooter, other victims, and weapons.232 Exigent 
circumstances and the community caretaker function justified the officer’s 
initial intrusion into the apartment.233 During the course of this search one 
officer discovered readily apparent expensive stereo equipment, which 
seemed out of place in the dilapidated dwelling.234 Since the officer had an 
inkling the equipment was stolen, he proceeded to read the equipment’s 
serial numbers and manipulating pieces, including lifting a turntable to view 
its underside.235 The officer reported the turntable’s serial number to his 
headquarters and was informed the turntable had been stolen.236 The officer 
immediately seized the turntable.237  
Justice Scalia focused on the manipulation of the equipment—
specifically lifting the turntable to view its underside—as opposed to the 
recording of the equipment’s serial numbers.238 Such manipulation 
constituted a search separate from the search for the shooter, weapons, and 
any injured persons, which was “the lawful objective” of the officer’s entry 
into the apartment.239 Taking action distinct from the lawful “objectives of 
the authorized intrusion . . . did produce a new invasion of respondent’s 
privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.”240 
The officer lacked probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen.241 In 
the absence of probable cause, Justice Scalia was unwilling to extend to 
                                                           
230 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987). 
231 Id. at 323.  
232 Id.  
233 Id. at 324. 




238 Id. at 324–25. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 325. 
241 Id. at 326. 
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officers the power to search and seize an object during a search unrelated 
to the lawful purpose that justified the initial entry.242  
Critically, the level of intrusiveness is not a factor to be considered in 
the analysis. In the Court’s dissenting opinion, Justices Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, and Powell were dismayed at Justice Scalia’s conclusion, 
focusing heavily on the fact that the officer’s conduct was not intrusive.243 
Specifically, the dissent was dissatisfied by the distinction between simply 
reading a serial number on an object and moving that same object a few 
inches in order to read its serial number.244 Such a distinction arguably 
“trivializes the Fourth Amendment.”245 Ultimately, if reasonable suspicion 
exists that an object in plain-view is evidence of a crime, the dissent believes 
a cursory inspection of such items—even one that involves moving those 
items—is a constitutionally permissible way of verifying such suspicion.246 
Justice Scalia stressed that a cursory inspection can never involve moving 
items; a visual inspection is all that is justified.247 A “search is a search, even 
if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.”248  
The dissent’s support of an intrusiveness inquiry is problematic. 
Broadly, the test of intrusiveness creates the exceptional likelihood that 
court decisions will frequently be inconsistent. There is no way to 
adequately define what constitutes “too intrusive” in light of the vast array of 
factual scenarios.249 For example, some people, including Justice Alito, 
believe deviating a few feet while walking up a driveway is completely 
nonintrusive; others disagree.250 Regardless of the intrusiveness of such 
deviation, that deviation is obviously unrelated to conducting a lawful knock-
and-talk. That is all that matters. 
From a policy perspective, a warrant should be required when 
conducting searches in and around the home. If the officer had probable 
cause to believe stolen equipment was within the apartment, he would have 
needed probable cause to obtain a warrant to search and seize that 
equipment prior to entering the apartment.251 The home is sacred and 
                                                           
242 Id. at 327. 
243 Id. at 331 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
244 Id. at 332–33 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
245 Id. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
246 Id. at 335 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
247 Id. at 328. 
248 Id. at 325. 
249 See, e.g., Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1681–83 (2018).  
250 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting); but see Collins, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1681–83.  
251 See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321.  
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deserves the most stringent protection.252 Justice Scalia’s conclusions in 
Hicks were beautifully simple and effectively translatable to the curtilage 
context.253 A test of whether an officer’s intrusion relates to a lawful purpose 
for entering the curtilage is an efficient way of determining the ultimate 
question: whether the officer’s actions exceeded the scope of the implied 
license to conduct a knock-and-talk and as a result, were unreasonable. This 
test is more manageable because it mitigates linguistic difficulties. 
The final task of this article is to attempt to define when an officer’s 
intrusion fails to relate to a lawful purpose for entering one’s curtilage and, 
as a result, when an officer’s action exceeds the scope of the implied license. 
Any such definition, if employed, would require a rigorous case-by-case 
analysis of the factual circumstances. As mentioned, Florida v. Jardines 
defined the implicit license in this context as permitting all visitors to 
approach a home, knock, wait momentarily for an answer, and in the 
absence of an invitation to remain within the curtilage longer, to then leave.254 
The “social norms” that invite a visitor to approach the front door of one’s 
home does not invite that same visitor to conduct a search upon arrival.255  
As previously argued, the actions of the officer’s in Jardines, Chute, 
and Collins were clearly unrelated to the lawful purpose of conducting a 
permissible knock-and-talk.256 They all involved officers who either ventured 
to an impermissible location within the curtilage, stayed an impermissible 
amount of time within the curtilage, employed impermissible devices or 
articles within the curtilage, or some combination of the three. Additionally, 
the time of day an officer enters the curtilage should be given considerable 
weight. The preceding pertinent facts comprise a non-exclusive list of 
relevant considerations. Depending on the context, other critical objective 
evidence may be available. In sum, a totality of the circumstances approach 
should be employed when determining whether the officer’s intrusion 
related to a lawful purpose for entering one’s curtilage and as a result, 
whether an officer’s action exceeded the scope of the implied license. 
First, borrowing language from United States v. Shuck, a 2013 case 
arising out of the Tenth Circuit, a state agent may only approach a home 
using the “normal route of access” used by anyone visiting the home.257 
Similarly, a visitor approaching the home should initially be required to 
                                                           
252 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6. 
253 See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321. 
254 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8. 
255 Id. at 9. 
256 Jardines, 569 U.S. 1; Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018); State v. Chute, 908 
N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 2018). 
257 United States v. Shuck, 713 F.3d 563, 568 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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approach the home’s front door in a linear fashion, as opposed to seeking 
out a homeowner in the backyard.258 Only in rare instances should a state 
agent or any visitor be allowed to seek out the homeowner in another 
location within the curtilage.259 The normal route of access will, however, 
necessarily vary depending on the factual context. Critically, this route of 
access does not condone deviations in course. For example, in Jardines the 
officer allowed his canine to move across the breadth of the homeowner’s 
porch, as opposed to simply approaching the front door in a linear path and 
remaining stationary in that location until being greeted by the 
homeowner.260 If the canine had refrained from transcending the breadth of 
the porch, and instead simply alerted upon reaching the front door, as 
noted, the result in Jardines may have been different.  
Additionally, in Collins v. Virginia, the officer initially failed to 
approach the home’s front door at all. Only after deviating substantially 
from the path taken by a normal visitor did the officer attempt to reach the 
homeowner at the front door.261 Professor Wayne R. LaFave argues “[a]ny 
substantial and unreasonable departure from the area where the public is 
impliedly invited exceeds the scope of the implied invitation.”262 In contrast 
to LaFave’s argument that only substantial deviations are unreasonable, I, 
channeling Justice Scalia, argue any deviation unrelated to the lawful 
purpose of conducting a knock-and-talk is unreasonable and constitutionally 
impermissible. LaFave’s argument is dangerous from the perspective that it 
would minimize the protections afforded to homeowners under the Fourth 
Amendment. An officer should not have to deviate substantially to exceed 
the scope of the implied license. There is also a myriad of ways to interpret 
the meaning of a “substantial and unreasonable departure.” Such a test 
would increase the likelihood of inconsistent holdings. Ultimately, the 
license is to conduct a knock-and-talk; not to look around within the 
curtilage. In sum, the determination as to whether the state agent 
approached the home’s front door using the normal route of access, without 
deviations, is persuasive as to whether the state agent’s intrusion within the 
curtilage related to a lawful purpose allowing the state agent to intrude upon 
the curtilage. 
Second, if the officer desires to conduct a knock-and-talk, the knock 
must be completed “promptly.”263 Once the knock is complete, the officer 
                                                           
258 See United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 679–80 (8th Cir. 2011). 
259 Id. 
260 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 3. 
261 Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1668. 
262 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(c), at 578 (2004). 
263 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8. 
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may only wait “briefly” for the homeowner to respond.264 What these 
adverbs actually mean will be the subject of substantial argument depending 
on the circumstances. What is then required is an extremely narrow 
interpretation of these terms that leaves officers with little margin for error. 
The officer may not act lackadaisically. Rather, the officer must immediately 
and without delay knock on the homeowner’s door. Within a matter of 
moments, the officer will be aware of whether or not he will actually be 
greeted by the homeowner. If the homeowner does not greet the officer or 
give a sign that a greeting is pending, the officer must leave. Even the slightest 
action that extends the time it takes to conduct a permissible knock-and-talk 
should be sharply circumscribed. The justifications allowing ingress to the 
home do not comport with officer actions that attempt to expand the 
traditional invitation to approach the home. Any delay in conducting a 
permissible knock-and-talk is persuasive evidence that the officer’s intrusion 
was unrelated to a lawful purpose for intruding within one’s curtilage. 
Third, an officer may not employ complementary devices or objects 
during a prospective knock-and-talk. The accompaniment of a detection 
dog is a clear example of what an officer should not be able to do while 
conducting a knock-and-talk. Such accompaniment, whether it concerns a 
detection dog, a metal detector, or a thermal scanner, inter alia, pertains to 
whether the officer’s intrusion within the curtilage relates to the purpose of 
conducting a lawful knock-and-talk. Bringing such devices or objects is 
persuasive evidence that the officer’s intrusion is unrelated to conducting a 
lawful knock-and-talk.  
In contrast to my position as to the relevance of what accompanies the 
officer, Justice Scalia argues “[i]t is not the dog that is the problem, but the 
behavior that here involved use of the dog.”265 The behavior Justice Scalia is 
referring to is the officer’s “snooping about” on Jardines’ front porch.266 
There is not a true distinction between the dog itself and the behavior that 
“involved use of the dog.”267 Regardless, Justice Scalia is correct in that the 
critical question is not what the officer’s purpose was, but whether the 
officer’s actions, including being accompanied by a device or object, 
constituted an intrusion unrelated to the lawful purpose that justifies a 
knock-and-talk. Therefore, the officer’s purpose is irrelevant. For example, 
in Chute, if the officer stated his purpose was to “snoop” about but did not 
deviate from the path to the house, the officer’s conduct would not have 
been unreasonable.268 
                                                           
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 9 n.3. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 578, 588 (Minn. 2018). 
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Finally, although it is difficult to precisely define the appropriate times 
an officer may approach a home, due in large part to varying daylight hours 
and shifting seasons, the officer may never approach the home to conduct 
a knock-and-talk after sunset or before sunrise. Such intrusions are not 
desirable, customary, nor respectful. Personal privacy and freedom of 
repose in one’s dwelling trumps an officer’s desire to ferret out potential 
criminal activity, unless a rare exigency exists.269 Although such late night or 
early morning intrusions are persuasive evidence that the officer’s intrusion 
is unrelated to the purpose of conducting a knock-and-talk, there are safety 
concerns as well.270 Such late night and early morning intrusions could cause 
the homeowner to panic. In comparison to knock-and-talks conducted in 
the daylight, “searches under the cover of darkness create a greater risk of 
armed response—with potentially tragic results—from fearful residents who 
may mistake the police officers for criminal intruders.”271 In sum, the 
preceding is a non-exclusive list of considerations that courts should make 
when determining whether an officer’s actions related to the lawful purpose 
of conducting a knock-and-talk, and as a result, were constitutional. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this article is two-fold. The first was to show that 
although courts often struggle linguistically in their discussions of purpose, 
these courts are not inconsistent when they proclaim the subjective intent of 
an officer is in fact irrelevant to the constitutionality of an officer’s actions. 
Particularly in the context of searches within curtilage and permissible 
knock-and-talks, the courts’ language causes confusion as to whether the 
subjective motivations of an officer truly are irrelevant. Notwithstanding 
these linguistic difficulties, courts rely solely on objective evidence to 
determine an officer’s ostensible purpose. In all three of the highlighted 
cases, courts determined the officer’s actions were objectively unreasonable. 
Although it was not explicitly stated, such determinations were due to the 
fact that the officers exceeded the scope of their implied license to knock-
and-talk by taking action unrelated to conducting a lawful knock-and-talk. 
 Second, this article implores the U.S. Supreme Court to do away 
with the two-prong test concerning the constitutionality of searches within 
one’s curtilage as enunciated in Jardines. All references to an officer’s 
purpose cease in the hope that existing confusion is mitigated. As a 
substitute for the two-prong test, the Court should adopt a test that analyzes 
whether an officer’s actions are related to the lawful purpose that allows the 
                                                           
269 See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987). 
270 Id.  
271 State v. Cada, 923 P.2d 469, 478 (Id. Ct. App. 1996). 
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officer to legally enter one’s curtilage. This framework would rely on a non-
exclusive list of objective considerations which include: (1) the officer’s 
location within the curtilage; (2) the amount of time the officer remained 
within the curtilage; (3) whether the officer entered the curtilage alone or 
was accompanied by another device or article; (4) and the time of day the 
officer entered the curtilage. However, no one fact should be dispositive. 
The totality of the circumstances is key. Such a test would mitigate existing 
confusion and uncertainty. Ultimately, my proposal entails a manageable 
test that allow courts to answer the critical question: whether the officer’s 
actions were objectively reasonable. 
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